Dr Anastassiya Mahon, an Associate Lecturer in Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, and the Founder of Unlimitedpolitics.com, considered the security aspect of the China-Central Asia relationship, specifically delving into the perception of Chinese influence in Central Asia and emphasising the potential necessity for China to reconsider its approach in light of Russia’s shifted attention and increased interest from the US and UK in the region. She saw an increased Chinese presence in Central Asia as a window of opportunity for Beijing to expand its sphere of influence there, as Russia’s resources and political will are mostly directed at the war in Ukraine, which gives other major international players a chance to reconsider their role in the region. However, Russia’s distraction in Ukraine does not automatically mean that China will succeed in filling the vacuum, as there are obstacles. For example, said Mahon, there is a disparity in how Central Asia’s elites view China’s presence there, and how the general public perceives it. Given a basic public mistrust of Chinese influence in the region, China needs to present itself in such a way as to not cause extra domestic problems for Central Asian countries, as this would slow cooperation. Also, China would need to balance its interests in the region against those of other major actors such as the US and UK. And it is important to see that an increased Chinese presence is not seen as fully positive, Mahon argued – for example, the presence of China brings greater security concerns.

Another concern vi-a-vis an increased Chinese presence in Central Asia is the Chinese crackdown on Islam within its own borders. With Islam a central part of many Central Asian countries’ identities, China might not be viewed favourably. In conclusion, Mahon said it is not prewritten that China will fill the vacuum caused by the war in Ukraine, and that China would prefer bilateral relationships with Central Asian countries, as this would make it easier to avoid too much transparency and accountability.

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, underscored the impact of Western re-engagement in the region and how this might affect Chinese considerations. He pointed to two parallel sets of developments – an increased interest in the region across the world, and at the same time a bottom-up dynamic, with far more intra-regional, trans-Caspian assertiveness, as there is more space for regional countries to do things on their own. He also addressed the prospect of a real hegemonic transition from Russia to China – not something Central Asia will look forward to. Great powers still matter, said Wolff, hence the relationships between them also matter, and so it would be a mistake to ignore these wider interests. Wolff considered whether the greater trans-regional assertiveness and renewed interest in Central Asia is driven by the dynamics of a new Great Game, adding that the region has huge mineral, wealth, which makes it very interesting to other nations. Yet, since the Kremlin’s influence in the region has waned, Central Asia has a chance to hedge against one single great power having huge influence.

Wolff also looked at various issues relating to regional nations, such as the problems of violent extremism and drug trafficking, and highlighted the need to manage risks associated with climate change, such as water scarcity and climate-induced migration, which could create instability. Therefore, a shared priority across most Central Asian states, and outside players, must be to prevent instability and disruption of trade routes and supply chains.

In his closing remarks, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner MP pointed to the apparent reasons behind the creation of the C5 + 1in 2015: regional security, economic development and political stability in Central Asia. But the raw truth, argued Gardiner, was that it was seen as a way for the US containment policy to reduce Russian influence in the region and to counteract the growing presence of China. Russia and China have a common interest in keeping the US out of their Central Asian back yard, but the C5 provides a perfect trade route through Central Asia, to undermine Western sanctions against Moscow and re-export Chinese goods to Russia. Gardiner concluded that China is carefully watching America’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis to guide future efforts diplomatically, informatically and economically. and China will take advantage of weaknesses in the Western alliance to sow division.

Dr Anastassiya Mahon, an Associate Lecturer in Security Studies at Aberystwyth University, and the Founder of Unlimitedpolitics.com, considered the security aspect of the China-Central Asia relationship, specifically delving into the perception of Chinese influence in Central Asia and emphasising the potential necessity for China to reconsider its approach in light of Russia’s shifted attention and increased interest from the US and UK in the region. She saw an increased Chinese presence in Central Asia as a window of opportunity for Beijing to expand its sphere of influence there, as Russia’s resources and political will are mostly directed at the war in Ukraine, which gives other major international players a chance to reconsider their role in the region. However, Russia’s distraction in Ukraine does not automatically mean that China will succeed in filling the vacuum, as there are obstacles. For example, said Mahon, there is a disparity in how Central Asia’s elites view China’s presence there, and how the general public perceives it. Given a basic public mistrust of Chinese influence in the region, China needs to present itself in such a way as to not cause extra domestic problems for Central Asian countries, as this would slow cooperation. Also, China would need to balance its interests in the region against those of other major actors such as the US and UK. And it is important to see that an increased Chinese presence is not seen as fully positive, Mahon argued – for example, the presence of China brings greater security concerns.

Another concern vi-a-vis an increased Chinese presence in Central Asia is the Chinese crackdown on Islam within its own borders. With Islam a central part of many Central Asian countries’ identities, China might not be viewed favourably. In conclusion, Mahon said it is not prewritten that China will fill the vacuum caused by the war in Ukraine, and that China would prefer bilateral relationships with Central Asian countries, as this would make it easier to avoid too much transparency and accountability.

Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, underscored the impact of Western re-engagement in the region and how this might affect Chinese considerations. He pointed to two parallel sets of developments – an increased interest in the region across the world, and at the same time a bottom-up dynamic, with far more intra-regional, trans-Caspian assertiveness, as there is more space for regional countries to do things on their own. He also addressed the prospect of a real hegemonic transition from Russia to China – not something Central Asia will look forward to. Great powers still matter, said Wolff, hence the relationships between them also matter, and so it would be a mistake to ignore these wider interests. Wolff considered whether the greater trans-regional assertiveness and renewed interest in Central Asia is driven by the dynamics of a new Great Game, adding that the region has huge mineral, wealth, which makes it very interesting to other nations. Yet, since the Kremlin’s influence in the region has waned, Central Asia has a chance to hedge against one single great power having huge influence.

Wolff also looked at various issues relating to regional nations, such as the problems of violent extremism and drug trafficking, and highlighted the need to manage risks associated with climate change, such as water scarcity and climate-induced migration, which could create instability. Therefore, a shared priority across most Central Asian states, and outside players, must be to prevent instability and disruption of trade routes and supply chains.

In his closing remarks, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner MP pointed to the apparent reasons behind the creation of the C5 + 1in 2015: regional security, economic development and political stability in Central Asia. But the raw truth, argued Gardiner, was that it was seen as a way for the US containment policy to reduce Russian influence in the region and to counteract the growing presence of China. Russia and China have a common interest in keeping the US out of their Central Asian back yard, but the C5 provides a perfect trade route through Central Asia, to undermine Western sanctions against Moscow and re-export Chinese goods to Russia. Gardiner concluded that China is carefully watching America’s response to the Russia-Ukraine crisis to guide future efforts diplomatically, informatically and economically. and China will take advantage of weaknesses in the Western alliance to sow division.

In a tactical change,Jamaat’s leadership is now considering changing its position from the time of the Bangladesh Liberation War, although for some,its fundamental position has not changed even though the rhetoric has become softer.Asked by an audience member whether it were fair to describe Jamaat as a proxy of Pakistan and puppet of the ISI, he said that it was.

Exploring the theme of Jamaat and democracy,Dr Md Nazrul Islam, Professor of Political Studies at Shahjalal University of Science and Technology, Sylhet, Bangladesh,highlighted opportunities for reconciliation between Jamaat and democracy within secular and semi-secular parties. He emphasised the need to understand the formation of Jamaat-e-Islami in the context of the anti-colonial movement in India in 1941. He explained that Maududi was an extremist at the time because he didn’t believe Pakistan should be ruled by non-Islamic leaders and was initially against Western democracy and human rights, but softened, advocating for an Islamic democracy that differed from Western secular democracy.

Speaking about the position of Jamaat on democracy, he said that neither Islam nor democracy is monolithic; therefore political Islam isn’t monolithic either. He suggested that Jamaat and democracy are not necessarily incompatible, adding that the party has supported constitutionalism and electoral politics. He added that there is a growing interest in reform and a need to acknowledge the mistake made in 1971 in siding with the Pakistan army, even though some are not ready to do this. He warned of the danger of repressing Jamaat – it could lead to radicalization and said that some elements of Western democracy are inherent in Islam.

Several of the panellists pointed out that Jamaat-e-Islami was an outcome of the rise of political Islam, which has had far-reaching implications for the geopolitics of the region. The failure of secular political parties to strengthen democracy also provided fertile ground for the growth of extremist politics, while the negation of democracy by successive military regimes in Bangladesh and Pakistan also gave it a boost.

In his closing comments, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner spoke of the need to leave religion in the private rather than the political sphere and of ‘the paradox of tolerance’ – that is, should intolerance be tolerated? He argued that Islam has not gone through the same trauma as Christianity or that of Western nations. While Jamaat-e-Islami is providing for some of the necessities of life – e.g. education, social aid, etc. – if, through democratic means, an Islamist party gains power, what if it then become undemocratic and refuse to allow others to replace it? That is the danger.

Bangladesh’s undoubted development success has always depended on responsiveness: the Bangladeshi state needs to be oriented to listening to its people, and meeting their basic needs, and it has done this very well up to now. It may not be as democratic as Western models, but has been very good at listening to its citizens. However, it will find it difficult to continue to do this, the more authoritarian it becomes, warned Hossain.

Journalist and Badrul Syed Ahsan considered the role of democracy in Bangladesh’s global growth over the years. Democracy is a state of mind, he said, and for Bangladesh, it is a work in progress. The county had started off on right track in 1972, drawing up a Constitution within a year of independence – not many countries do this, Ahsan said. But in 1975 tragedy struck with the assassination of founder Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and most of his family., and years of military rule followed as the nation fell victim to various coups and abortive coups, undergoing 21 years of what Ahsan called ‘an age of darkness’.

Bangladesh’s democratic journey has been a tortuous path, and what matters is the future. Excellent economic growth means Bangladesh is on the right track, though over-population and climate problems are serious issues. Democracy depends on rule of law, freedom of speech etc, but also on diversification of exports, argued Ahsan This all depends on what happens in the January 2024 elections, and how credible they will be. The government’s performance on the economy over past 14 years has been very impressive, with infrastructure development and food security. Bangladesh is still moving towards a better democracy, and there is reason to believe the democratic system will be sustained. Yet, whatever happens in the election, Ahsan believed that the next government needs to bridge the widening gap between rich and poor, and between political parties, as well as bring about decentralistion and jobs, and a deep politicisation of political institutions so that they are state institutions rather than being subservient to particular political parties.

In his closing comments, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner said that the major climate catastrophe facing Bangladesh in the coming years needs a huge response on a war footing, if Bangladesh is to have a sustainable future.

Dr Mariam Mufti, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Waterloo, discussed the difficulties of ignoring the mistrust between the US and Pakistan, which has stemmed primarily from differing perspectives on what purpose this alliance serves for them both. In terms of foreign policy, she said, Pakistan has been largely motivated by India, having seen India as an antagonisticneighbour, whilethe US has been motivated by containing Communism, and more recently on China. This is important to understanding US-Pakistan relations, with both a Chinese and Russian presence impacting US-Pakistan relations. Dr Muftialso discussed the politics of aid-dependency and unbalanced civil-military relations, as well as differing attitudes between the elites and masses towards the US, with the educated, English-speaking elites who have vested interests in America being more pro-US, and the massesmuch less so. Sheconcluded with what she saw as key areas that might help to resuscitate the US-Pakistan relationship. These mightinclude the US shiftingits focus from security toengaging Pakistan in the non-security realm; finding common ground on issues such as climate change, technology and intelligence-sharing, andboostingentrepreneurship and people-to-people interactionrather than engaging in government-to-military interactions, which could resolve some of the cultural miscommunication between the two countries.

Looking at the US’s strategic pivot to Asia, as part of its intensifying security competition with China over Taiwan, Dr Julian Spencer-Churchill (Schofield), Associate Professor of Political Science at Concordia University, argued that US-Pakistan relations remain stable, due largely to favourable circumstances available to Islamabad. Regarding the possibility of a China-Taiwan conflict, he said the big question is: what will Pakistan doin the event of this? While Chinese allies such asMyanmar andNorth Korea are ramping up an anti-US position on the Asian littoral, Pakistan has notdone anything like this, which is a very good sign for the US, as it is a very neutralist position. The proliferation of neutral states, sustained by China as an alternate source of investment, market and weapons provider, has reduced the US’s ability to isolate target countries, argued Spencer-Churchill. In addition, Pakistan’s status as a democracyincreases the credibility of its moderate foreign policy, he said, while the complexity of Near Eastern and Southeast Asian international relations, and the ongoing war in Ukraine – from which the principal lesson that can be learned, he said, is that ‘neutrals matter’ – have made Pakistan a stable pivot in Asia.

Closing the event, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner said that the military is, and always has been, the key to power in Pakistan. Its fundamental principle is that close ties with the US are central to Pakistan’s geopolitical relevance – never more so than now, during a time of economic, political and ecological crisis. The US-Pakistan relationship has always been based on military and counter-terrorism cooperation, on strategic geopolitical influence in the region and, coming a very poor third, on development, trade and humanitarian investment. Yet, while the US has long been committed to stability and investment in Pakistan, it is veering towards collaboration with other partners in the region – possibly in response to Pakistan’s ties with China, which has aggressively invested in Pakistan through CPEC, and become Pakistan’s number one source of FDI.

Dr Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Affiliated Lecturer in International Relations of the Middle East & North Africa at the University of Cambridge, addressed Iran’s foreign relations vis-à-vis its Gulf neighbours and with the wider world, Europe, the US, Russia and China, and how the current civil unrest is impacting those relationships. We all know Iran has been under sanctions for decades, she said, and that it has been a rogue state. But its isolation and insulation from the outside world has now come into sharp focus, and is playing a part in what is happening now.That said, is there a role for external powers in the turmoil taking place in Iran, do the Iranian people want it, and is it even possible? With the Supreme Leader elderly and unwell, who, asked Farmanfarmaian, will be next leader, and what kind of groups will be the source of his power? Protests, she anticipated, could help to trigger a change at the top more quickly than anticipated. Farmanfarmaian also looked at three key areas of Iran’s foreign relations: the country’s immediate neighbours, the Gulf and Middle East states, for whom the upheaval in Iran generally bodes ill; the West, including Europe, with its focus on human rights; and Tehran’s relations with rising powers Russia and China, with the latter having a key role to play in how the protests turn out, given that Beijing provides surveillance materials such as facial recognition and AI.

Focusing his comments around the answer to the webinar’s central question, historian Dr Marouf Cabi, a Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics’ Middle East Centre, said today’s unrest has changed the face of Iran domestically and internationally. These protests can’t be seen as simply a continuation of previous protests, he argued, but as a gradual revolution that started several years ago. People in Iran now know more about each other – for example,they have a greater awareness of theKurdish people and movement. Cabi also saw the need to ask another question: what kind of change will guarantee a new kind of direction for Iran, and make way for a democratic alternative?New structures that guarantee freedoms for all groups and a more equal gender order are required, and more cultures and languages need to be elevated to the same position as the Persian language and literature. So, concluded Cabi, to have a democratic direction, a complete change of structure must happen in Iran. This will require time and patience, though he was optimisticit will happen.

In his closing address, Barry Gardiner MP, Chair of The Democracy Forum, praised the panellists’ incisive presentations, and highlighted their unanimity in the belief that Iran has to develop its own way forward, and that blanket sanctions areimpeding them finding that way, as they are entrenching the power of the regime. Gardiner asked whether the West should be progressing with the JCPOA, as it would give greater scope to the regime, allowing it to develop nuclear weapons.The panellists’‘hands off’ messagewas difficult for politicians in the West to accept, added Gardiner,as theydid not like to be seen as powerless in the face of repressive regimes.

Broadening the focus to a more regional viewpoint, Dr Ali Cheema, Associate Professor of Economics, Lahore University of Management Sciences and Research Fellow, IDEAS, looked at Pakistan’s domestic political economy challenges and development, in light of what might be learned from Sri Lanka’s recent experiences. He drew parallels between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, given their structural weaknesses, and how these have been worsened within the context of the global economic crisis. But Cheema cautioned against being reductive, as each South Asian nation has a different set of fragilities, underpinned by growth models that are themselves fragile.

Dr Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs & Director of the Rising Powers Initiative at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, also addressed the regional repercussions of the Sri Lankan crisis, especially what it means for India’s role vis-à-vis Colombo, and in the region. As a strategically located island nation, this has been both a boon for Sri Lanka and, vis-à-vis India and China, a bane. She spoke of how the region is being redefined, as are regional roles and expectations, with Quad member Japan now a major player, seen as an honest broker able to develop, along with other Quad members, restructuring packages and provide alternatives to the China option, especially the BRI. Ollapally said that, previously, India had watched helplessly as Sri Lanka fell into Beijing’s arms. But, with the Ukraine war diverting most of the international community’s attention, China then vanished from the scene and India appeared as a first responder with a huge aid package, far outstripping China’s. Sri Lanka, she added, had been overly optimistic in its expectations of China, which is a tough customer when it comes to bailouts, as it is more concerned with its own economic situation. Many countries are in debt to China (eg Pakistan, African nations), and the upshot is a slowing down of the BRI, which had been speeding up. At the same time, Sri Lanka has underestimated India – despite the island nation begging for global help, only India came good. India’s expectations of Sri Lanka have also increased, as the crisis has given India the opportunity to push back China. The Modi government has been much quicker than its predecessors to realise that, in order to project itself globally, India needs to take care of its immediate neighbourhood – otherwise there are others waiting in the wings, like China, to play that role. So Sri Lanka, concluded Ollapally, is a test case in India’s journey towards being a global power.

Barry Gardiner MP, Chair of the Forum, closed the event by considering some of the elements of a useful rescue package for Sri Lanka. More money would need to be channelled to the bottom of society, and fuel and fertiliser would have to reach farmers for healthy harvests next year. Regarding lessons the region could learn from Sri Lanka’s situation, Gardiner stressed the importance of borrowing to invest, not to consume, putting funds into the hands of the people, who will help drive growth, tackling corruption and fostering transparency within the polity.

Lucas Myers, Program Coordinator at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, addressed China’s interests and policy towards Afghanistan, looking at stability and mitigating risks, including risks of cross-border terrorism. He touched on China’s Afghanistan policy since the US withdrawal, which engaged with the Taliban (through humanitarian aid, including Covid vaccines, and reduced tariffs) whilst not formally recognising them. Although Beijing argues that the threat of terrorism from Uyghur militants and the ETIM is a serious spillover risk in Xinjiang, and has struck an agreement with the Taliban to remove Uyghur militants from border regions, Myers believed that the actual risk is exaggerated by Beijing to justify its repressive policies. In fact, he added, the main security threat to Chinese interests emanating from Afghanistan is not in Xinjiang, but rather from the wider region, for example, the TTP and ISIS-K, which target Chinese assets and nationals in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. Myers also addressed China’s ambitions of regional connectivity and economic engagement, saying Beijing is pragmatic, not ideological, in its dealings with regional powers.

In his closing message, TDF Chair Barry Gardiner MP spoke of China’s deep reservations over the Taliban’s new role in Afghanistan, and said that an important part of Beijing’s motivation in seeking stability in Afghanistan is protecting existing BRI projects in Pakistan, whilst potentially opening Afghanistan to future investments. It has been suggested, said  Gardiner, that China would be happy to dangle promises and engage in talks on BRI and CPEC extensions to Afghanistan. But it won’t move ahead with anything on the ground until it is confident of political and security concessions.